Security Kritik

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# Security Kritik

## Topic Introduction: Security K

Every year, the National Debate Association releases a *yearly topic* for students to debate. *The Policy Debate resolution for 2022-2023 is as follows:*

#### Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.

Breaking down the text of this topic gives you three topics for to center cases around: increasing security cooperation with NATO in **artificial intelligence**, **biotechnology**, and **cybersecurity**.

Your objective as the negative will be to **negate** the resolution – Meaning, you will need to either **disprove the affirmative** or **offer an alternative solution to the resolution**. This file will focus on the latter.

### What is a Kritik?

Critiques, (better known in debate as “Kritiks” or “K” arguments), are critical arguments that challenge the mindsets or assumptions made by the affirmative. It’s typically a negative argument, and running this argument takes a higher understanding of debate’s technical terms.

**It is not recommended to run Kritiks without understanding what it means, nor for the sake of confusing your opponent. This will not take the debate anywhere if neither side can comprehend the argument. For these reasons, this is a file you should probably use only AFTER you’ve debated in a couple of other tournaments and have a solid understanding of disadvantages and CPs.**

### Negative Strategy

When using this file as the negative, there are few things to keep in mind. First, there is a 1NC “foundation” that has the usual generic link to the affirmative’s case, the impact (significance of your argument), and alternative (an “alternative” method to the affirmative’s way of doing things).

If you wish to, which you should, be more specific in your criticism there are more specific links in the “Link” section of the file. There is also a “2NC/1NR Framework” section. You will want to use this section in the 2NC/1NR to frame the debate. Importantly, you will need to make the argument that fiat is illusory or not real.

If we’re going to talk about treating things as threats, you can still argue things like “all violence comes from the desire to protect ourselves.”

It’s interesting, because you can have something of a uniqueness claim – that “we are always already unsafe.” We’re standing on a rock that’s flying through space at millions of miles a minute and around a giant hot ball that could explode (solar flare) at any moment – and we would die without even knowing it. We are always threatened and never secure, and yet we have a psychological drive to protect ourselves. Everything we do comes from the desire to protect ourselves and secure our happiness and favored things.

Thus, it’s not “how do we make ourselves secure?” but “how do we deal with our insecurity?”

The most common answer you’ll find is “threats are real,”– which may be true, but we’re always already unsafe. Threats are socially constructed. Why does a state have a military? We build the military because there are others out there that may want to hurt us – and we have to protect ourselves from them. That’s the purpose of lethal autonomous weapons, and cybersecurity, and nukes and soldiers.

Slavoj Žižek, a Slovenian philosopher, once said it is so easy for people to imagine an apocalypse, zombies, what are we going to do when the asteroid hits us, or when climate change is unbearable? But it is much harder to imagine an alternative– we assume threats are here to stay, it’s natural, and that it’s the best way to be.

*Fiat* is just an act of imagining doing the plan, so why can’t the negative team imagine another world? It *can* go both ways!

This rhetoric of seeing people as threats is what causes "threats" in the first place, because we try to constrain "threats" and they respond. China is not a "threat", but the US believes it is, so we try to contain them with Obama's Asia Pivot (2012). They then panic and must respond (antisatellite tests in 2007), because America is beating down their doorstep (Australian military deployments). Arms races and miscalculation are the product of these security dilemmas that nations escalate to crises.

### Affirmative Strategy

Answering this argument requires understanding its basic arguments in the context of whichever affirmative you choose to run.

You will need to remind the judge about the purpose of fiat. If its entire purpose is to provide the aff with enough ability to debate the implications of their case, then allowing the negative to also use takes away from the fairness of the round. The negative will claim,

You should be able to advocate for a *permutation*. A *permutation* is the argument that we should **do both the affirmative plan as well as the negative’s alternative.**

When answering the K remember you want to “F-STOP” the K. Always make the following arguments:

Framework – defend why your affirmative matters and the methodology behind your affirmative

Solvency – You need to make an argument that the Alternative does not solve the affirmative

Theory – You should have a theoretical objection to the K. If there is also a counterplan/DA strategy in the round that should be conditionality. If the K is being framed as a Floating PIK you also need to defend against that.

Offense – Have offensive reasons that your affirmative is good. These function as disadvantages to the alternative

Permutation – You should always perm the K. The best perms take the language of the alternative and also advocate the affirmative. If you cannot figure out how to write that language the next best idea is to say: “perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative.”

## Argument Glossary

**AWS** (noun) – Autonomous Weapons Systems, a synonym for a type of AI the aff may interact with.

**Conceptual** (noun) – Occurring primarily in thought our relating to mental concepts **Threat construction** (noun) – the manner in which international governments and bodies view others as a perceived “threat” to constantly prepare against.

**Securitization/Securitizing** (noun) – The act of a country/nation/military preparing itself from external threats due to threat construction.

**Stigma** (noun) – A mark of disgrace associated with a particular act or action.

**The Other/Otherizing** (noun) – A philosophy term defined as the state of being different from the social identity of a person, and judging those that do not meet that norm. This can extend to collective groups as those who are perceived by the group as being different in some way.

### Debate Terms

**Fiat** – Fiat stems from the word “should” in the resolution. It is the idea that we should assume the AFF plan in order to test its merits, without the question of whether it realistically would pass in the real world.

**“Net worse/Net better”** – an eloquent way to say “overall worse/overall better”.

**Status quo** – used to describe the current state of affairs, or the current situation the case is set in.

**Impact** – the reason a given argument is important. It is used to explain why an argument is important, and why the judge should vote for you.

**Extend (verb)** – to “extend” an argument made in the 1AC to later speeches.

**Extension (noun)** – a category of argument that are made past the 1AC. Used to continue an argument made from previous speeches.

**Link** – a card/evidence that “links” two arguments together. Without a link to the resolution, you risk being irrelevant to the debate.

**Impact turn** – an argument that the opponent’s claim benefits your argument.

**Shell** – A type of argument meant to be generic and read before using any specific links.

## Strategic Overview

# 1NC – Threat Construction Shell

#### The affirmative plan was morally flawed from the start – Perceiving any non-US or NATO nations as “threats to eliminate” is rooted in fear, which blinds the United States into emotionally-charged judgements.

**Rythoven 18** (Eric Van Rythoven, Instructor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, 12-17-2018, accessed on 6-17-2022, Brill, "On Backlash: Emotion and the Politicisation of Security", <https://brill.com/view/journals/eris/5/3/article-p139_7.xml>)

These embodied judgments are significant because they can function as a powerful source of certainty. In informationally dense environments, emotions can cut through the blooming, buzzing confusion and give us confidence in our interpretation of events. One way this occurs is through convictions. Writing at the turn of the 20th century, William James argued that emotions of religious experience helped create especially strong beliefs – what he referred to as convictions – in the existence of God.13 Today, modern psychologists argue moral convictions are deeply tied to emotional experience.14 Another way this occurs is through dispositions. Even mild emotional reactions towards objects and events can suppress conscious reflection and promote unthinking forms of action.15 American officials who felt distrust towards Iran, for example, were disposed to accept the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program despite ambiguous evidence.16 Whether through unconscious dispositions or more outwardly visible moral convictions, emotions can dramatically reduce the ambiguity of the world and make us certain that one interpretation is ‘true’, while others are decisively ‘false’.

#### These judgements lead countries into developing technology for the sole purpose of securitizing against backlash – The act of constantly preparing for backlash from fear-constructed threats.

#### Rythoven continues:

Taking this widened range of emotional experience as an entry point, this essay examines how emotions contribute to the politicisation of security. The discussion focuses on the understudied phenomena of ‘backlash’: situations where security claims provoke hostile emotional reactions. A backlash is not the same thing as a failed securitising move. Security claims can often fail because they are met with apathy – as is the case of esoteric threats such as declining biodiversity or the emergence of artificial intelligence. In other cases, audiences may be sympathetic to a security claim even if they ultimately reject it – as is the case of residents who refuse mandatory evacuations when faced with natural disasters. The concept of backlash denotes something different: it is not a matter of security claims failing to resonate, but a situation where claims resonate in a way that provokes hostility and contention. It signals a visceral and reactionary episode where security claims are adamantly rejected, speakers are rebuked, and the subject of ‘security’ becomes intensely controversial. In sum, backlash represents a distinctive kind of politicisation of security.

## Links

### Link – Lethal Autonomous Weapons

#### Lethal autonomous weapons were borne from an ideology of fear. The logic that we must always prepare for “the next big bad” produces a never-ending cycle of violence, a *self-fulfilling prophecy*.

**Hellmann et al. 17** (Gunther Hellmann and Benjamin Herborth, Gunther Hellmann is professor of political science and a principal investigator in the Cluster of Excellence, "The Formation of Normative Orders," at the Goethe University Frankfurt, Herborth is an assistant professor of the Faculty of Arts, specializing in international relations at the University of Groningen, January 2017, accessed on 6-17-2022, Cambridge Core, "Uses of 'the West'", https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uses-of-the-west/B42DDCC72312CBC4D5D0888E0FCED54B)

Geopolitical determinacy based on an unavoidable power expansion as the default option is fundamental. But a default option would still leave some room for maneuver, if this default were perhaps not realized in the case at hand. Here, a geopolitical framing adds further determinacy in moving the analysis from the level of observation to the level of action and in assuming that we simply cannot afford to ignore the possible worst case. This is an understandable, if often counterproductive, practical move, but it has quite pernicious implications, both theoretical and prac- tical. It basically claims that whether or not there really is some ‘necessary’ tendency to power expansion can be considered secondary; we simply assume it, because, to quote former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, there are ‘also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know.’12 On the theoretical level, this ultra-prudential (or ultra-paranoid) statement does not resolve anything: we still do not know whether or not the behavior of states is characterized by a tendency to expand their power, and hence to collide. And, on the practical level, if every state behaves on the general assumption that such a tendency exists, the risk of a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy looms large in the picture.

### Link – Cybersecurity

#### The narrative of securitizing AI tech is most commonly found in cybersecurity policies. Cybersecurity was created with the justification of “protecting the nation” from threats, not its people. As a result, policies related to cybersecurity are counterproductive to the cause.

**Burton and Christou 21** (Joe Burton and George Christou, Burton is Associate Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, George Christou is a British-American chemist, currently the Drago and Distinguished Professor at the University of Florida, previously the Earl Blough Professor at the Indiana University., 11-1-2021, accessed on 6-17-2022, Oxford University Press, "Bridging the gap between cyberwar and cyberpeace", <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1727/6412439?login=true>)

The shortcomings of cyberwar narrative and practice are evident in other areas of policy and intellectual debate too. Cyber warfare is often used to justify protecting the nation-state, even when the protection of people or groups, including vulnerable communities, within the state is not fully considered. Cyber warfare has led to overly militarized approaches to cyber security and the involvement of the military (and intelligence agencies) in traditionally civilian areas of society, even when police, justice or crime-based approaches may be more suitable to countering cyber threats (in the same way that the ‘war on terror’ was an overly militarized approach to a transnational security threat). Often, military involvement is justified by reference to the notions of the permanency and constancy of cyberwar; as the British Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir Nick Carter described it, we are ‘at war every day’.26 And yet, cyberspace is not a controllable or conquerable territory, and is fundamentally ill-suited to the logic of national, defendable boundaries.27 As Lawson argues, the proliferation of these types of narratives leads to ‘the adoption of counterproductive, even dangerous policies’.

### Link – China Advantage

#### China is constantly seen by the United States and NATO as a “strict and threatening *other*”. This only serves to fuel a self-fulfilling view of China that justifies violence.

**Pan 4** (Chengxin Pan, The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, 6-1-2004, accessed on 6-16-2022, SAGE Journals, "The “China Threat” in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of other as Power Politics Authors Authors", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/030437540402900304?journalCode=alta>)

More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.

### Link – Russia Advantage

#### Historically, Russia has been seen as a threat to U.S. hegemony due to the Cold War-era stigma that Russia is a “communist state that needs to be purged”. The U.S. military was complicit in this.

**Hellmann et al. 17** (Gunther Hellmann and Benjamin Herborth, Gunther Hellmann is professor of political science and a principal investigator in the Cluster of Excellence, "The Formation of Normative Orders," at the Goethe University Frankfurt, Herborth is an assistant professor of the Faculty of Arts, specializing in international relations at the University of Groningen, January 2017, accessed on 6-17-2022, Cambridge Core, "Uses of 'the West'", https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uses-of-the-west/B42DDCC72312CBC4D5D0888E0FCED54B)

Debate over a country’s foreign policy identity was suppressed during the Cold War, but this is no longer the case. This would apply to all countries of the former Warsaw Pact, possibly also including Russia (if Russia is seen as suppressed by the Soviet Union, a line of thought which was of some prominence in the 1990s) and potentially also Italy. Geopolitical thought is particularly well suited to respond to such an ontological anxiety, since it provides allegedly objective and mate- rial criteria for circumscribing the boundaries (and the internal logic) of ‘national interest’ formulations. Invoking national interest almost inevitably mobilizes justifications in terms wider than the interest of the ruler or the government. Such wider justification can be given by ideologies, as in the case of anti-communism and anti-capitalism during the Cold War, or with reference to the ‘nation’, for instance. But when yesterday’s certitudes have gone missing, national interests have to be anchored anew. In this context, geopolitics in its classical under- standing provides ‘coordinates’ for thinking a country’s role in world affairs. Deprived of traditional reference points and with a challenged self-understanding or outside view of its role, spatial logic can quickly fill this ideational void and fix the place of the state and its national interests within the international system or society. And geopolitics is particularly well suited to such a role, since it relies upon environmental determinism from both physical geography (mobilized often through strategic thinking) and human/cultural geography typical for discourses essentializing a nation.

## Impacts

### Impact – Poverty

#### Being blinded by war scenarios the affirmative creates is a smokescreen, distracting from global issues like poverty, which is only exacerbated through war.

**DeParle 20** (Jason DeParle, Jason DeParle is a senior writer at The New York Times and a frequent contributor to The New York Times Magazine. Previously he served as a domestic correspondent in Washington for The Times., 4-16-2020, accessed on 6-17-2022, The New York Times, "A Gloomy Prediction on How Much Poverty Could Rise", <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/upshot/coronavirus-prediction-rise-poverty.html>)

The pandemic crippling the American economy portends a sharp increase in poverty, to a level that could exceed that of the Great Recession and that may even reach a high for the half-century in which there is comparable data, according to researchers at Columbia University. The coming wave of hardship is likely to widen racial disparities, with poverty projected to rise twice as much among blacks as among whites. Poverty is also likely to rise disproportionately among children, a special concern because brain science shows that early deprivation can leave lifelong scars. Children raised in poverty on average have worse adult health, lower earnings and higher incarceration rates. If quarterly unemployment hits 30 percent — as the president of one Federal Reserve Bank predicts — 15.4 percent of Americans will fall into poverty for the year, the Columbia researchers found, even in the unlikely event the economy instantly recovers. That level of poverty would exceed the peak of the Great Recession and add nearly 10 million people to the ranks of the poor.

### Impact – Structural Violence

#### Prioritizing the cyclical violence only reifies the structural violence many face. The affirmative plan plays into this violence.

**Hoddy 20** (Eric T. Hoddy, Eric is an Associate Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of York, 4-29-2020, accessed on 6-17-2022, Taylor & Francis, "From agency to root causes: addressing structural Barriers to transformative justice in transitional and post-conflict settings", <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21582041.2020.1812706>)

What do we mean by ‘harm-generating relations and structures and ‘root causes’? Our understanding here draws on insights from realist social theory, systems thinking and complexity theory (Archer, 1995; 2003; Bhaskar, 2016; Jackson, 2001; Mingers, 2014; Sayer, 2010). Simply put, root causes are the underlying ‘generative’ or ‘causal mechanisms’ that make events occur. The mechanisms of interest here are those which link particular societal relations and structures to violent or harmful outcomes and constraints on action (Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016). What makes a structure are various objects and practices that stand in relation to one another, such as the practice of exchange between buyers and sellers that characterise market structures. Structures steer human activity are continually reproduced and occasionally transformed by the actors implicated in them. The emergent ‘powers’ of structures to behave in certain ways and their ‘liabilities’ towards certain kinds of change are what is referred to as mechanisms. Mechanisms lie at the heart of many problems that transformative justice is concerned with, such as indirect violence and poverty, since these phenomena can only occur as a function of societal structures. Both mechanisms and structures are trans-empirical phenomena, that is, they are not readily open to empirical measurement and can only be understood indirectly, through retroductive enquiry that examines their empirical effects. Structures may be social, cultural, political, economic and so on, and are experienced in terms such as poverty, discrimination, and the lack of access to public services.Crucially, the way mechanisms operate and the effects they have depends on their interaction with various conditions, or other mechanisms, such as material and cultural constraints, political decisions, and how people decide to act (Mingers, 2014). Processes and outcomes are contingent, and change is non-linear and causes difficult to trace. Mechanisms may operate with and against each other to produce similar or different outcomes, and feedback may ensue where outcomes affect change elsewhere in the system. Mechanisms may remain unactivated under particular configurations of conditions. In addition, mechanisms exist at multiple scales, such as from the biophysical level to those found in the structures of the global economy. The association of a given event or phenomenon with mechanisms at different scales reflects the ‘laminated’ nature of these systems (Bhaskar, Danermark, & Price, 2017).

## Alternative

#### As the negative, it is within our ground to encourage debate by proposing an alternative method to the plan.

#### Thus, the alternative is to embrace a world free of threat construction, free of the securitization that only perpetuates violence.

## Solvency

**Prioritize our argument – Even if the aff wins that wars are a consequence of reality, addressing the root cause of wars should come first.**

**Glover 18** (Andrew Glover, Andrew Glover is a sociologist based in Melbourne, 6-25-2018, accessed on 6-17-2022, Quillette, "Beware of Root Causes", <https://quillette.com/2018/06/25/beware-of-root-causes/>)

Once a problem’s root causes are found, night becomes day. What was a murky cloud of befuddling complexity becomes a social problem structure so clear that its correct solutions are obvious.

It’s easy to see why the prospect of uncovering and describing root causes is so attractive to researchers, activists, and policymakers. For researchers, seeking to identify the root cause of a social issue appears intellectually ambitious, revealing the base social structure of what we experience in everyday life. For activists, identifying and tackling the root cause of something is likely to be far more satisfying than merely addressing the symptoms. For policymakers in government, the prospect of funding programs and initiatives that address the root of a problem is also appealing, given that it may reduce their need for future expenditure in dealing with the manifestation of the problem in society.

## Answers To

### A2 Framing: Engage with the Real

#### Cross-apply Rythoven 18 and prefer our framing: The aff’s method of engaging in endless violence only serves to reinforce a self-fulfilling prophecy:

#### The affirmative plan is just as imaginary as ours’; It’s only a matter of choosing which side is more ethically right. Nothing done in a debate round truly passes in real life, so our alternative does work.

### A2 Permutation: Do Both

#### The perm is nonsense - the AFF says they prevent war by developing AI for war, while we reject the plan for that very reason.

#### And, Cross-apply Hoddy 20: You cannot do both. The permutation will fail because the affirmative plan is complicit in structural violence, and the negative’s is not. Only through the alternative method can solve.

**Hoddy 20** (Eric T. Hoddy, Eric is an Associate Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of York, 4-29-2020, accessed on 6-17-2022, Taylor & Francis, "From agency to root causes: addressing structural Barriers to transformative justice in transitional and post-conflict settings", <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21582041.2020.1812706>)

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### A2 War is Real/Escalation

#### Extend Rythoven 18: The rhetoric of escalation is built on fear of “what threat will strike next”, which is just a byproduct of securitization.

#### Thinking of war as inevitable is dangerous because it only justifies further violence. Treating conflict as part of human nature only serves to allow war to continue.

**Einsenstein 08** (Zillah Eisenstein has been Professor of Politics at Ithaca College in New York for the last 35 years and is presently a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Resexing militarism for the globe, Feminism and War: Confronting US Impeeralism pg.34)

Hobbes was not right about most men or women. Yet the naturalization and normalization of war are maintained by this notion of a mythic human nature, which is also constructed as male. It is dangerous to think that war is inevitable, and intrinsic to human nature. I do not think genes are simply nature, nor do I think human nature is natural at all. The concept of nature is truly political at the start. It is a construct that reifies the needs of those who need us to fight their wars. In this techno-masculinist world that we inhabit we are shown war as the drama of manhood. Sometimes it is named the ‘Oedipal compulsion,’ and the ‘psychic quest for the father.’ Yet over 120,000 dutiful sons who fought the Vietnam War came home to commit suicide, twice the number killed in the war (Boose 1993: 504, 605)

# AFF Answers

Remember to F-STOP!

When answering the K remember you want to “F-STOP” the K. Always make the following arguments:

**Framework** – defend why your affirmative matters and the methodology behind your affirmative

**Solvency** – You need to make an argument that the Alternative does not solve the affirmative

**Theory** – You should have a theoretical objection to the K. If there is also a counterplan/DA strategy in the round that should be conditionality. If the K is being framed as a Floating PIK you also need to defend against that.

**Offense** – Have offensive reasons that your affirmative is good. These function as disadvantages to the alternative

**Permutation** – You should always perm the K. The best perms take the language of the alternative and also advocate the affirmative. If you cannot figure out how to write that language the next best idea is to say: “perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative.”

### Framework – Engage with the Real

#### Engaging with the physical is necessary to avoid reproducing the status quo.

**Bryant 12** Professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, We’ll Never Do Better Than a Politician: Climate Change and Purity, 5/11/12, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/well-never-do-better-than-a-politician-climate-change-and-purity/)

However, pointing this out and deriding market based solutions doesn’t get us very far. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright dangerous and irresponsible. The fact of the matter is that 1) we currently live in a market based world, 2) there is not, in the foreseeable future an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), above all, we need to do something now. We can’t afford to reject interventions simply because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions of how things should be. We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us.¶ It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible. The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power, though he has gotten better.

### Solvency

#### Extend your affirmative plan here, tying an explanation into why the judge should prefer your argument below. Consider the following questions:

* Why would your plan be better than the alternative method the negative proposes?
* Why is it important to solve for the affirmative?
* Does prioritizing conceptual violence over actual violence truly benefit anyone?

### Offense

#### Strategic action is key – the alternative only recreates the most violent aspects of their impact claims. Only through urgent, real action can we hope to solve any of their impacts.

**Liotta ’15** (P.H. Liotta Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy) 2005 “Through the Looking Glass” Sage Publications

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer toaddressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement.

### Permutation

#### The affirmative proposes that we perm: Doing both the aff plantext and negative alternative method.

#### While our affirmative resolves material impacts, the negatives’ method solves structural ones.

#### Cross-apply Bryant 12 and prefer our framing of the round – We have no choice but to engage with the material world.

# Answers to Answers

#### Banning or regulating autonomous weapons still links

**Hynek and Solovyeva 22** (Nik Hynek and Anzhelika Solovyeva, Nik Hynek is Professor of Politics at Charles University, Prague, Anzhelika Solovyeva is a doctoral candidate, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Security Studies, Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, 3-11-2022, accessed on 6-16-2022, SpringerLink, "Operations of power in autonomous weapon systems: ethical conditions and socio-political prospects - AI & SOCIETY", <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-020-01048-1>)

However, any attempt at regulating or banning weapons still hinges upon a prevailing interpretation of strategic interests. Strategic interests and political positions are not immutable; they can evolve at times bringing about outcomes previously thought to be inconceivable. An example is the Chemical Weapons Convention signed, including by the P5, after a long history of using chemical weapons in armed conflicts (World War I, Vietnam War, Iran-Iraq War, etc.). So we cannot discard the likelihood of change in the current state of affairs on AWS, especially as a preemptive ban is just one among several options being examined. Meanwhile, the CCW can arguably continue to postpone any committal decision to another time or give states a mandate to negotiate in earnest some sort of regulation, not necessarily a ban, on AWS. Incidentally, we should not rule out at this juncture that, if CCW discussions do not produce effective results in a timely manner and a deadlock is reached by 2021, other forums or solutions may be more seriously considered to remedy the diplomatic impasse.5 Some still insist the CCW should be given the resources to perform its originally intended function, and propose to reform its mode of decision-making (Rosert and Sauer 2020, p.20). Though a ban on AWS is unlikely to be enacted or effective (Crootof 2015, pp.1883–1891), an international legally binding instrument is still most actively pursued (Acheson 2017, p.2). However, an international ‘regime’ may be complemented by additional protocols, domestic laws, as well as other informal or non-binding mechanisms (Crootof 2015, pp.1897–1903). Alternatively, it may be set in motion by ‘interim’ steps, for instance, a political declaration, before legally binding measures are embraced (Acheson 2017, p.2). Since there are many pathways, the dividing lines drawn in this article should not be seen as static. They are dynamic and contingent on changes in world politics, strategic interests and technological developments, as well as the ability and willingness to trade-off.

## AT: Cybersecurity threats are real

#### Cybersecurity threats are overblown, fearmongering swamps moderation and hurts necessary policy solutions

**Overland 17** (Indra Overland, PhD at the University of Cambridge and has since worked extensively on the post-Soviet energy sector, including oil, gas and renewables, 11-22-2017, accessed on 6-16-2022, Energy Research & Social Science, "PerspectiveThe geopolitics of renewable energy: Debunking four emerging myths", <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629618308636?via%3Dihub>)

The growth of renewable energy is occurring simultaneously with another major development: digitalization. Digitalization can help keep grids balanced, even as large numbers of renewable energy producers raise and lower production depending on the weather [61]. This causes academics, security think tanks, intelligence and security organizations, parliamentary committees, and consultancies to fear that terrorists or the intelligence services of hostile countries may hack the computers that control utilities and grids [39], [62]. Clearly, there is cause for these concerns as society becomes dependent on new technologies and the growing complexity of digital systems for grid management can give rise to new cybersecurity challenges. However, sometimes such concerns are overstated, as in when the potential large-scale hacking of smart meters was likened to “the modern day equivalent of a nuclear strike” [63] cited in [62]. Those who raise concerns about the cyber-security of electricity grids at seminars and conferences often invoke the case of a cyber-attack against three energy distribution companies in Ukraine in 2015 [64]. As a result of this attack, substations in 30 locations in Western Ukraine were shut down, cutting off the electricity supply to 230 000 people for a period of between 1 and 6 hours [65]. While utilities and electricity distribution networks in many countries are subject to frequent hacking attempts, this is considered to have been the first successful attack on this scale and with such geopolitical significance, foreshadowing the role of cyber-attacks in the future energy system. However, it is worth noting that Ukraine was a special case, comprising unusually dilapidated infrastructure, a high level of corruption, a military conflict with Russia, and exceptional possibilities for Russian infiltration due to the historical linkages between the two countries [66]. Despite all these issues, only 0.015% of Ukraine's daily electricity consumption was affected, and only for a few hours [67]. The use and associated risks of electricity are not new per se, as all homes, companies, and institutions in developed countries already depend on electricity grids, and grids have been controlled digitally for decades. It is also probable that increased use of renewable energy will lead to greater decentralization, with millions of prosumer households supplying electricity. This may actually make the system more resilient, as many different units will have to be hacked to destabilize the system as a whole. Like many pessimistic, policy-oriented forecasts, those concerning digitalization and cybersecurity have merit, but are also potentially self-destructing predictions: the more such predictions are made, the greater the likelihood that incumbents will be encouraged to implement counter-measures. In other words, the predictors are part of the social context about which they are trying to make a prediction and may influence that context in the process. As a source of policy recommendations, discourse on cybersecurity is therefore clearly useful; as a prediction about the future energy system it is trickier. As one of the rare critical contributions in the cybersecurity field put it, “Moderate and measured takes on cyber security threats are swamped by the recent flood of research and policy positions in the cyber research field offering hyperbolic perspectives based on limited observations” [68] (see also [69]).

#### Cybersecurity is already one of the top three security concerns of NATO

**Rythoven 18** (Eric Van Rythoven, Instructor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, 12-17-2018, accessed on 6-17-2022, Brill, "On Backlash: Emotion and the Politicisation of Security", <https://brill.com/view/journals/eris/5/3/article-p139_7.xml>)

NATO views on cyber-threats have been addressed in research but the field is far from overstudied. In “NATO and Cyber security” Roger André Tosbotn investigates the prominence of “cyber security” in NATO’s official documents, and examines the way in which NATO’s outwards understanding of the cyber domain has changed over time. The thesis adopts content analysis to measure word frequency (prominence) and discourse analysis to examine change of the conceptualization of the “cyber domain” over time. The documentation analysed span from 2002, when “cyber” was first mentioned in official NATO documents, until the beginning of 2016 when the thesis was written. Tosbotn’s results illustrate two main points; firstly, they indicate a relative prominence of “cyber” vis-à-vis other aspects NATO deem as important. Secondly, it elucidates several aspects of NATO’s strategic culture. Russia and terrorism remain the main concerns of the alliance, but mentions of “cyber” has come to rank third in overall mentions. In addition, critical junctures in the period of 2007-2009 (cyber-attacks in Estonia and Georgia) and 2014 (The Stuxnet virus) yielded a considerably higher frequency in mentions of “cyber”. The qualitative findings demonstrate a conceptualization that has grown to embody a rich variety of associations. Once a juncture has been reached the milieu and operation of NATO has transformed and forced them to reformulate “cyber” as a conspicuous security dimension.

#### Cyberthreats are real and could trigger Article 5

**Rythoven 18** (Eric Van Rythoven, Instructor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, 12-17-2018, accessed on 6-17-2022, Brill, "On Backlash: Emotion and the Politicisation of Security", <https://brill.com/view/journals/eris/5/3/article-p139_7.xml>)

The purpose of this section has been to reinforce the aim of the paper and to show that a case study of NATO is of interest. Cyber-threats are undoubtedly one of the Alliances main concerns and the understanding of them is constantly changing. Different cyber security strategies and agendas, elements of uncertainty, the absence of universal definitions, and the lack of consensus over how cyber-attacks should be evaluated render cyber security a delicate matter. Any counter measure has the potential of being controversial. In the worst of cases minor disagreements could escalate into full-scale conflict. Consequently, NATO declaring that cyber-attacks can trigger its Article 5 stress for a clarification of their structure of thought.

## AT: AWS threat is real

Some experts argue AI would make war less harmful

**Hynek and Solovyeva 22** (Nik Hynek and Anzhelika Solovyeva, Nik Hynek is Professor of Politics at Charles University, Prague, Anzhelika Solovyeva is a doctoral candidate, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Security Studies, Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, 3-11-2022, accessed on 6-16-2022, SpringerLink, "Operations of power in autonomous weapon systems: ethical conditions and socio-political prospects - AI & SOCIETY", <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-020-01048-1>)

To warrant and sustain their controversial stance on AWS, ban-resisting actors engage in what Sauer and Reveraert (2018, pp.446–447) call ‘stigma rejection’. They recognize the stigma but detach themselves from it. For example, both Russia and the US highlight the preservation of a meaningful human element in their AI-oriented military projects (TASS 2018; BBC 2019). The US furthermore insists that, even in the event of degraded or lost communications, teleoperated systems should not be capable of autonomously selecting and engaging targets (DoD 2012/2017). Following the same course, the UK has also underlined the signifcance of human direction for the application of lethal force (Country Statement 2018b). China has even called for a ban on the use of fully autonomous weapons (CSKR 2019a). The language of human ‘involvement’, ‘judgement’, ‘control’ and ‘responsibility’ has generally been agreed upon and formally codifed at the CCW (CCW 2018; CCW 2019a). However, the question of norm compliance remains shrouded in ambiguity, chosen by ban-resisting actors as an efective strategy to reconcile normative pressure and preference for strategic fexibility. During CCW GEE discussions, Russia has repeatedly requested to cut down on unnecessary details in the fnal report, especially when there has been no consensus or sufcient evidence. The US has in turn expressed concerns at the rigid concept of ‘human control’ (Acheson 2018; Acheson and Pytlak 2019). China’s diplomatic position on AWS can also be characterized by a degree of ‘strategic ambiguity’. This is evident, for instance, in its recent position papers and its national strategy of ‘civil-military fusion’ (Kania 2018). At the same time, it opposes a ban on the development or production of AWS (CSKR 2019a). The situation is similar to private companies in the US, Russia, China, Israel, Europe and beyond. While explicit about how human control is ensured, some continue working on technologies relevant to AWS. Quite a few do so even without clear, at least clearly declared, policies concerning the question of human control (PAX 2019, p.5–8). On top of that, ban-resisting actors have simultaneously resorted to what might be termed ‘counter-stigmatization’ (Sauer and Reveraert 2018, pp.446–447). Often backed by knowledge based expertise, they have tried to shift attention to the positive value of AWS (Country Statement 2018a, 2018b, 2019). Robert Work, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense, once 90 AI & SOCIETY (2021) 36:79–99 1 3 argued: ‘AI will make weapons more discriminant and better, less likely to violate the laws of war, less likely to kill civilians, less likely to cause collateral damage’ (Fryer-Biggs 2019). A clear indication of expert support is, for example, that the Berlin Statement was not endorsed unanimously at the experts’ workshop in Berlin (ICRAC, n.d.). Referring to computer scientist Ronald C. Arkin, professor George R. Lucas also assumed that autonomous robotic technology might ‘render war itself, and the conduct of armed hostilities, less destructive, risky, and indiscriminate’ (Lucas 2014).